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Abstract
The application of deep recurrent networks to audio transcription has led to im-
pressive gains in automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems. Many have demon-
strated that small adversarial perturbations can fool deep neural networks into
incorrectly predicting a specified target with high confidence. Current work on
fooling ASR systems have focused on white-box attacks, in which the model archi-
tecture and parameters are known. In this paper, we adopt a black-box approach
to adversarial generation, combining the approaches of both genetic algorithms
and gradient estimation to solve the task. We achieve a 89.25% targeted attack
similarity after 3000 generations while maintaining 94.6% audio file similarity. 1
1 Introduction
Although neural networks have incredible expressive capacity, which allow them to be well suited
for a variety of machine learning tasks, they have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks
over multiple network architectures and datasets [7]. These attacks can be done by adding small
perturbations to the original input so that the network misclassifies the input but a human does not
notice the difference.
So far, there has been much more work done in generating adversarial examples for image inputs
than for other domains, such as audio. Voice control systems are widely used in many products
from personal assistants, like Amazon Alexa and Apple Siri, to voice command technologies in cars.
One main challenge for such systems is determining exactly what the user is saying and correctly
interpreting the statement. As deep learning helps these systems better understand the user, one
potential issue is targeted adversarial attacks on the system, which perturb the waveform of what
the user says to the system to cause the system to behave in a predetermined inappropriate way.
For example, a seemingly benign TV advertisement could be adversely perturbed to cause Alexa to
interpret the audio as “Alexa, buy 100 headphones.” If the original user went back to listen to the
audio clip that prompted the order, the noise would be almost undetectable to the human ear.
There are multiple different methods of performing adversarial attacks depending on what information
the attacker has about the network. If given access to the parameters of a network, white box attacks
are most successful, such as the Fast Gradient Sign Method [7] or DeepFool [11]. However, assuming
an attacker has access to all the parameters of a network is unrealistic in practice. In a black box
setting, when an attacker only has access to the logits or outputs of a network, it is much harder to
consistently create successful adversarial attacks.
In certain special black box settings, white box attack methods can be reused if an attacker creates
a model that approximates the original targeted model. However, even though attacks can transfer
1Code and samples available at https://github.com/rtaori/Black-Box-Audio
Preprint. Work in progress.
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Figure 1: Example of targeted adversarial attack on speech to text systems in practice
across networks for some domains, this requires more knowledge of how to solve the task that
the original model is solving than an attacker may have [10, 13]. Instead, we propose a novel
combination of genetic algorithms and gradient estimation to solve this task. The first phase of the
attack is carried out by genetic algorithms, which are a gradient-free method of optimization that
iterate over populations of candidates until a suitable sample is produced. In order to limit excess
mutations and thus excess noise, we improve the standard genetic algorithm with a new momentum
mutation update. The second phase of the attack utilizes gradient estimation, where the gradients
of individual audio points are estimated, thus allowing for more careful noise placement when the
adversarial example is nearing its target. The combination of these two approaches provides a 89.25%
average targeted attack similarity with a 94.6% audio file similarity after 3000 generations.
1.1 Problem statement
Adversarial attacks can be created given a variety of information about the neural network, such as
the loss function or the output probabilities. However in a natural setting, usually the neural network
behind such a voice control system will not be publicly released so an adversary will only have access
to an API which provides the text the system interprets given a continuous waveform. Given this
constraint, we use the open sourced Mozilla DeepSpeech implementation as a black box system,
without using any information on how the transcription is done.
We perform our black box targeted attack on a model M given a benign input x and a target t by
perturbing x to form the adversarial input x′ = x+ δ, such that M(x′) = t. To minimize the audible
noise added to the input, so a human cannot notice the target, we maximize the cross correlation
between x and x′. A sufficient value of δ is determined using our novel black box approach, so we
do not need access to the gradients of M to perform the attack.
1.2 Prior work
Compared to images, audio presents a much more significant challenge for models to deal with. While
convolutional networks can operate directly on the pixel values of images, ASR systems typically
require heavy pre-processing of the input audio. Most commonly, the Mel-Frequency Cepstrum
(MFC) transform, essentially a fourier transform of the sampled audio file, is used to convert the
input audio into a spectogram which shows frequencies over time. Models such as DeepSpeech (Fig.
2) use this spectogram as the initial input.
In a foundational study for adversarial attacks, Cisse et al. [5] developed a general attack framework
to work across a wide variety of models including images and audio. When applying their method to
audio samples, they ran into the roadblock of backpropagating through the MFC conversion layer.
Thus, they were able to produce adversarial spectograms but not adversarial .wav files.
Carlini and Wagner [3] overcame this challenge by developing a method of passing gradients through
the MFC layer, a task which was previously proved to be difficult [5]. They applied their method
to the Mozilla DeepSpeech model, which is a complex, recurrent, character-level network that can
decode translations at up to 50 characters per second. With a gradient connection all the way to the
raw input, they were able to achieve impressive results, including generating samples over 99.9%
similar with a targeted attack accuracy of 100%. While the success of this attack opens new doors
for white box attacks, adversaries in a real-life setting commonly do not have knowledge of model
architectures or parameters.
Alzantot et al. [1] have demonstrated that black-box approaches for targeted attacks on ASR systems
are possible. Using a genetic algorithm approach, they were able to iteratively apply noise to audio
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Figure 2: Diagram of Baidu’s DeepSpeech model [8]
samples, pruning away poor performers at each generation, and ultimately end up with a perturbed
version of the input that successfully fooled a classification system. This attack was conducted
on the Speech Commands classification model [1], which is a lightweight convolutional model for
classifying up to 50 different single-word phrases.
Extending the research done by [1], we propose a genetic algorithm and gradient estimation approach
to create targeted adversarial audio, but on the more complex DeepSpeech system. The difficulty of
this task comes in attempting to apply black-box optimization to a deeply-layered, highly nonlinear
decoder model that has the ability to decode phrases of arbitrary length. Nevertheless, the combination
of two differing approaches as well as the momentum mutation update bring new success to this task.
1.3 Background
Dataset For the attack, we follow [3] and take the first 100 audio samples from the CommonVoice
test set. For each, we randomly generate a 2-word target phrase and apply our black-box approach
to construct an adversarial example. More details on evaluation can be found in section 3. Each
sample in the dataset is a .wav file, which can easily be deserialized into a numpy array. Our
algorithm operates directly on the numpy arrays, thus bypassing the difficulty of dealing with the
MFC conversion.
Victim model The model we attack is Baidu’s DeepSpeech model [8], implemented in Tensorflow
and open-sourced by Mozilla.2 Though we have access to the full model, we treat it as if in a black
box setting and only access the output logits of the model. In line with other speech to text systems
[4, 5], DeepSpeech accepts a spectrogram of the audio file. After performing the MFC conversion,
the model consists 3 layers of convolutions, followed by a bi-directional LSTM, followed by a
fully connected layer. This layer is then fed into the decoder RNN, which outputs logits over the
distribution of output characters, up to 50 characters per second of audio. The model is illustrated in
figure 2.
Connectionist temporal classication While the DeepSpeech model is designed to allow arbitrary
length translations, there is no given labeled alignment of the output and input sequences during
training time. Thus the connectionist temporal classication loss (CTC Loss) is introduced, as it allows
computing a loss even when the position of a decoded word in the original audio is unknown [3].
DeepSpeech outputs a probability distribution over all characters at every frame, for 50 frames per
second of audio. In addition to outputting the normal alphabet a-z and space, it can output special
character . Then CTC decoder C(·) decodes the logits as such: for every frame, take the character
with the max logit. Then first, remove all adjacent duplicate characters, and then second, remove any
special  characters. Thus aabb will decode to abb [3].
As we can see, multiple outputs can decode to the same phrase. Following the notation in [3], for any
target phrase p, we call pi an alignment of p if C(pi) = p. Let us also call the output distribution of
our model y. Now, in order to find the likelihood of alignment pi under y:
Pr(p|y) =
∑
pi|C(pi)=p
Pr(pi|y) =
∑
pi|C(pi)=p
∏
i
yipi
2 https://github.com/mozilla/DeepSpeech
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as noted by [3]. This is the objective we use when scoring samples from the populations in each
generation of our genetic algorithm as well as the score used in estimating gradients.
Greedy decoding As in traditional recurrent decoder systems, DeepSpeech typically uses a beam
search of beam width 500. At each frame of decoding, 500 of the most likely pi will be evaluated,
each producing another 500 candidates for a total of 2500, which are pruned back down to 500 for
the next timestep. Evaluating multiple assignments this way increases the robustness of the model
decoding. However, following work in [3], we set the model to use greedy decoding. At each timestep
only 1 pi is evaluated, leading to a greedy assignment:
decode(x) = C(argmax
pi
Pr(y(x)|pi))
Thus, our genetic algorithm will focus on creating perturbations to the most likely sequence (if
greedily approximated).
2 Black box attack algorithm
Algorithm 1 Black box algorithm for generating adversarial audio sample
Input: Original benign input x Target phrase t
Output: Adversarial Audio Sample x′
population← [x] ∗ populationSize
while iter < maxIters and Decode(best)! = t do
scores← −CTCLoss(population, t)
best← population[Argmax(scores)]
if EditDistance(t,Decode(best)) > 2 then
// phase 1 - do genetic algorithm
while populationSize children have not been made do
Select parent1 from topk(population) according to softmax(their score)
Select parent2 from topk(population) according to softmax(their score)
child←Mutate(Crossover(parent1, parent2), p)
end while
newScores← −CTCLoss(newPopulation, t)
p←MomentumUpdate(p, newScores, scores)
else
// phase 2 - do gradient estimation
top-element← top(population)
grad-pop← n copies of top-element, each mutated slightly at one index
grad← (−CTCLoss(grad-pop)− scores)/mutation-delta
pop← top-element + grad
end if
end while
return best
2.1 Genetic algorithm
As mentioned previously, Alzantot et al. [1] demonstrated the success of a black-box adversarial
attack on speech-to-text systems using a standard genetic algorithm. The basic premise of our
algorithm is that it takes in the benign audio sample and, through trial and error, adds noise to the
sample such that the perturbed adversarial audio is similar to the benign input yet is decoded as the
target, as shown in Figure 3. A genetic algorithm works well for a problem of this nature because it
is completely independent of the gradients of the model. Alzantot et al. [1] used a limited dataset
consisting of audio samples with just one word and a classification with a predefined number of
classes. In order to extend this algorithm to work with phrases and sentences, as well as with CTC
Loss, we make modifications to the genetic algorithm and introduce our novel momentum mutation.
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Figure 3: Diagram of our genetic algorithm
Figure 4: Overlapping of adversarial
(blue) and original (orange) audio sam-
ple waveforms. The perturbation is
barely noticeable
The genetic algorithm works by improving on each iteration, or generation, through evolutionary
methods such as Crossover and Mutation [9]. For each iteration, we compute the score for each
sample in the population to determine which samples are the best. Our scoring function was the
CTC-Loss, which as mentioned previously, is used to determine the similarity between an input audio
sequence and a given phrase. We then form our elite population by selecting the best scoring samples
from our population. The elite population contains samples with desirable traits that we want to carry
over into future generations. We then select parents from the elite population and perform Crossover,
which creates a child by taking around half of the elements from parent1 and the other half from
parent2. The probability that we select a sample as a parent is a function of the sample’s score.
With some probability, we then add a mutation to our new child. Finally, we update our mutation
probabilities according to our momentum update, and move to the next iteration. The population will
continue to improve over time as only the best traits of the previous generations as well as the best
mutations will remain. Eventually, either the algorithm will reach the max number of iterations, or
one of the samples is exactly decoded as the target, and the best sample is returned.
2.2 Momentum mutation
Algorithm 2 Mutation
Input: Audio Sample x
Mutation Probability p
Output: Mutated Audio Sample x′
for all e in x do
noise← Sample(N (µ, σ2))
if Sample(Unif(0, 1)) < p then
e′ ← e+ filterhighpass(noise)
end if
end for
return x′
The mutation step is arguably the most crucial component of the genetic algorithm and is our only
source of noise in the algorithm. In the mutation step, with some probability, we randomly add noise
to our sample. Random mutations are critical because it may cause a trait to appear that is beneficial
for the population, which can then be proliferated through crossover. Without mutation, very similar
samples will start to appear across generations; thus, the way out of this local maximum is to nudge it
in a different direction in order to reach higher scores.
Furthermore, since this noise is perceived as background noise, we apply a filter to the noise before
adding it onto the audio sample. The audio is sampled at a rate of fs = 16kHz, which means that
the maximum frequency response fmax = 8kHz. As seen by Reichenbach and Hudspeth [14], given
that the human ear is more sensitive to lower frequencies than higher ones, we apply a highpass filter
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at a cutoff frequency of fcutoff = 7kHz. This limits the noise to only being in the high-frequency
range, which is less audible and thus less detectable by the human ear.
While mutation helps the algorithm overcome local maxima, the effect of mutation is limited by the
mutation probability. Much like the step size in SGD, a low mutation probability may not provide
enough randomness to get past a local maximum. If mutations are rare, they are very unlikely to
occur in sequence and add on to each other. Therefore, while a mutation might be beneficial when
accumulated with other mutations, due to the low mutation probability, it is deemed as not beneficial
by the algorithm in the short term, and will disappear within a few iterations. This parallels the step
size in SGD, because a small step size will eventually converge back at the local minimum/maximum.
However, too large of a mutation probability, or step size, will add an excess of variability and prevent
the algorithm from finding the global maximum/minimum. To combat these issues, we propose
Momentum Mutation, which is inspired by the Momentum Update for Gradient Descent. With this
update, our mutation probability changes in each iteration according to the following exponentially
weighted moving average update:
pnew = α× pold + β|currScore− prevScore|
With this update equation, the probability of a mutation increases as our population fails to adapt
meaning the current score is close to the previous score. The momentum update adds acceleration
to the mutation probability, allowing mutations to accumulate and add onto each other by keeping
the mutation probability high when the algorithm is stuck at a local maximum. By using a moving
average, the mutation probability becomes a smooth function and is less susceptible to outliers in the
population. While the momentum update may overshoot the target phrase by adding random noise,
overall it converges faster than a constant mutation probability by allowing for more acceleration in
the right directions.
Algorithm 3 Momentum Mutation Update
Input: Mutation Probability p
Scores for the new population newScores
Scores for the previous population scores
Output: Updated mutation probability pnew
currScore = max(newScores)
prevScore = max(scores)
pnew = α× pold + β|currScore−prevScore|
return pnew
2.3 Gradient estimation
Genetic algorithms work well when the target space is large and a relatively large number of mutation
directions are potentially beneficial; the strength of these algorithms lies in being able to search
large amounts of space efficiently [6]. When an adversarial sample nears its target perturbation,
this strength of genetic algorithms turn into a weakness, however. Close to the end, adversarial
audio samples only need a few perturbations in a few key areas to get the correct decoding. In this
case, gradient estimation techniques tend to be more effective. Specifically, when edit distance of
the current decoding and the target decoding drops below some threshold, we switch to phase 2.
When approximating the gradient of a black box system, we can use the technique proposed by Nitin
Bhagoji et al. [12]:
FDx(g(x), δ) =
(g(x1 + δ)− g(x1))/δ...
(g(xn + δ)− g(xn))/δ

However, performing this calculation in full would be prohibitively expensive, as the audio is sampled
at 16kHz and so a simple 5-second clip would require 80,000 queries to the model for just one
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gradient evaluation! Thus, we only randomly sample 100 indices to perturb each generation when
using this method. When the adversarial example is already near the goal, gradient estimation makes
the tradeoff for more informed perturbations in exchange for higher compute.
3 Evaluation
3.1 Metrics
We tested our algorithm by running it on a 100 sample subset of the Common Voice dataset. For each
audio sample, we generated a single random target phrase by selecting two words uniformly without
replacement from the set of 1000 most common words in the English language. The algorithm
was then run for each audio sample and target phrase pair for 3000 generations to produce a single
adversarial audio sample.
We evaluated the performance of our algorithm in two primary ways. The first method is determining
the accuracy with which the adversarial audio sample gets decoded to the desired target phrase. For
this, we use the Levenshtein distance, or the minimum character edit distance, between the desired
target phrase and the decoded phrase as the metric of choice. We then calculated the percent similarity
between the desired target and the decoded phrase by calculating the ratio of the Levenshtein distance
and the character length of the original input, ie. 1 − Levenshtein(M(x′),t)len(M(x)) . The second method is
determining the similarity between the original audio sample and the adversarial audio sample. For
this, we use the accepted metric of the cross correlation coefficient between the two audio samples.
Figure 5: Histogram of levenshtein distances of attacks.
3.2 Results
Of the audio samples for which we ran our algorithm on, we achieved a 89.25% similarity between the
final decoded phrase and the target using Levenshtein distance, with an average of 94.6% correlation
similarity between the final adversarial sample and the original sample. The average final Levenshtein
distance after 3000 iterations is 2.3, with 35% of the adversarial samples achieving an exact decoding
in less than 3000 generations, and 22% of the adversarial samples achieving an exact decoding in less
than 1000 generations.
One thing to note is that our algorithm was 35% successful in getting the decoded phrase to match
the target exactly; however, noting from figure 5, the vast majority of failure cases are only a few edit
distances away from the target. This suggests that running the algorithm for a few more iterations
could produce a higher success rate, although at the cost of correlation similarity. Indeed, it becomes
apparent that there is a tradeoff between success rate and audio similarity such that this threshold
could be altered for the attacker’s needs.
A comparison of white box targeted attacks, black box targeted attacks on single words (classification),
and our method:
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Metric White Box Attacks Our Method Single Word Black Box
Targeted attack success rate 100% 35% 87%
Average similarity score 99.9% 94.6% 89%
Similarity score method cross-correlation cross-correlation human study
Loss used for attack CTC CTC Softmax
Dataset tested on Common Voice Common Voice Speech Commands
Target phrase generation Single sentence Two word phrases Single word
One helpful visualization of the similarity between the original audio sample and the adversarial
audio sample through the overlapping of both waveforms, as shown in figure 4. As the visualization
shows, the audio is largely unchanged, and the majority of the changes to the audio is in the relatively
low volume noise applied uniformly around the audio sample. This results in an audio sample that
still appears to transcribe to the original intended phrase when heard by humans, but is decoded as
the target adversarial phrase by the DeepSpeech model.
That 35% of random attacks were successful in this respect highlights the fact that black box
adversarial attacks are definitely possible and highly effective at the same time.
4 Conclusion
In combining genetic algorithms and gradient estimation we are able to achieve a black box adversarial
example for audio that produces better samples than each algorithm would produce individually. By
initially using a genetic algorithm as a means of exploring more space through encouragement of
random mutations and ending with a more guided search with gradient estimation, we are not only
able to achieve perfect or near-perfect target transcriptions on most of the audio samples, we were able
to do so while retaining a high degree of similarity. While this remains largely as a proof-of-concept
demonstration, this paper shows that targeted adversarial attacks are achievable on black box models
using straightforward methods.
Furthermore, the inclusion of momentum mutation and adding noise exclusively to high frequencies
improved the effectiveness of our approach. Momentum mutation exaggerated the exploration at the
beginning of the algorithm and annealed it at the end, emphasizing the benefits intended by combining
genetic algorithms and gradient estimation. Restricting noise to the high frequency domain improved
upon our similarity both subjectively by keeping it from interfering with human voice as well as
objectively in our audio sample correlations. By combining all of these methods, we are able to
achieve our top results.
In conclusion, we introduce a new domain for black box attacks, specifically on deep, nonlinear
ASR systems that can output arbitrary length translations. Using a combination of existing and novel
methods, we are able to exhibit the feasibility of our approach and open new doors for future research.
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